Arbitration Agreements That Discriminate In the Selection and Appointment of Arbitrators by Dasteel, Jeff
Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business
Volume 11 | Issue 4 Article 4
2012
Arbitration Agreements That Discriminate In the
Selection and Appointment of Arbitrators
Jeff Dasteel
UCLA Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and
Arbitration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Global
Law & Business by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeff Dasteel, Arbitration Agreements That Discriminate In the Selection and Appointment of Arbitrators, 11 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 383
(2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global/vol11/iss4/4
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS THAT DISCRIMINATE




In 2010, an English appellate court rocked the world of inter-
national arbitration when it declared that a provision in an arbitration
agreement restricting the selection of arbitrators to members of a par-
ticular religious group violated European Union laws banning discrim-
ination in employment.2  While the case of Jivraj v. Hashwani was on
appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court, there was concern in
the international arbitration community that more common restric-
tions on the qualifications of arbitrators related to national origin
might also be subject to challenge.  In that regard, two major interna-
tional arbitration rule sets give preference to the appointment of arbi-
trators who are not of the same national origin as any of the parties.3
These international rule sets may have needed to change, at least
when used in England, if Jivraj v. Hashwani had withstood appeal to
the Supreme Court.
One year later, in July 2011, the world of international arbitra-
tion breathed a collective sigh of relief when the Supreme Court over-
ruled the Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court determined that
arbitrators were not “employees” as the term was defined in European
Union employment laws, and, therefore, the European Union’s ban on
employment discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation, na-
tional origin, or gender did not apply to the selection and appointment
of an arbitrator.4
Was that collective sigh of relief warranted?  This article dis-
cusses (1) whether arbitration agreements that discriminate in the se-
lection and appointment of arbitrators may be prohibited under
United States law, and (2) the possible effects of anti-discrimination
1 Jeff Dasteel is a mediator, arbitrator and adjunct professor of law at UCLA law
school where he teaches a class in International Commercial Arbitration.  The au-
thor thanks his students Christina Burrows, Alexander Endl, and Jiaying Yu for
their important contributions to this article.
2 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 712, [24], [35], [2010] ICR 1435 (Eng.).
3 International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Arbitration and ADR Rules, art. 13,
¶ 5; International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Dispute Resolution
Procedures, art. 6, ¶ 4.
4 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [23], [43] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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laws on the validity and enforceability of those agreements and the
arbitration awards resulting from them.  This article accepts the pre-
mise that arbitrators are not “employees” of the parties as found by the
United Kingdom Supreme Court.  However, there are anti-discrimina-
tion laws in the United States that apply to independent contractors.
Indeed, there are anti-discrimination laws in the United States that
apply to all manner of contracts regardless of the character of the con-
tracting parties’ relationship.  This article concludes that arbitrators
may fall within the scope of anti-discrimination laws in the United
States raising the risk that arbitration agreements that include dis-
criminatory qualifications may be invalid under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act.  Finally, this article explores the possibility that non-
domestic arbitration agreements with discriminatory qualifications
may also be unenforceable under both the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, both of which are applicable
to non-domestic arbitrations, where a non-domestic arbitration pro-
ceeds under United States law or where a party seeks to enforce a for-
eign arbitral award in the United States.
II. THE DECISIONS OF THE ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM SUPREME COURT IN
JIVRAJ V. HASHWANI
In Jivraj v. Hashwani, the parties to an arbitration agreement
stipulated that “[a]ll arbitrators shall be respected members of the Is-
maili community and holders of high office within the community.”5
The agreement further provided that “[t]he arbitration shall take place
in London and the arbitrators’ award shall be final and binding on
both parties.”6
The underlying dispute in Jivraj v. Hashwani concerned a joint
venture to make investments in real estate around the world.7  It was
a secular contract made for a secular purpose and governed by English
law.8  When a dispute arose between the parties, the claimant initi-
ated arbitration and appointed a well-respected English barrister as
its arbitrator, but the barrister was not a member of the Ismaili com-
munity as required by the arbitration agreement.9
The claimant contended that the religious affiliation require-
ment within the arbitration agreement violated European Union regu-
lations against employment discrimination on the basis of religious
5 Id. ¶ 2.
6 Id.
7 Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.
8 Id. ¶ 2.
9 Id. ¶ 4.
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belief.10  The Court of Appeal determined that an arbitrator is an em-
ployee of the parties and that being of a particular religious affiliation
was not a genuine occupational requirement for the job.11  Therefore,
the subject arbitration clause amounted to a refusal to employ based
on religious belief in violation of European Union employment law.12
The Court also determined that the religious affiliation requirement
was central to the arbitration clause and could not be severed from the
arbitration agreement.13  The Court of Appeal, therefore, declared the
whole arbitration agreement invalid and unenforceable.14
The Supreme Court reversed this decision.15  The key question
was whether arbitrators are “employees,” who are covered by provi-
sions prohibiting employment discrimination, or independent contrac-
tors, who are not covered under the European Union anti-
discrimination rules.16  In determining that an arbitrator is not an
“employee,” the Court noted, “The arbitrator is in critical respects in-
dependent of the parties. His functions and duties require him to rise
above the partisan interests of the parties and not to act in, or so as to
further, the particular interests of either party.”17
The Supreme Court, therefore, held that European Union and
United Kingdom anti-discrimination regulations do not apply to arbi-
trators.18  The UK Supreme Court further stated in dicta that, even if
the anti-discrimination regulations did apply, the requirement that
the arbitrator be Ismaili was both objectively and subjectively justified
as a genuine occupational requirement.19
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Jivraj v. Hashwani confirmed
party autonomy to set up arbitration regimes designed to satisfy the
interests of the parties, even if those interests result in discrimination
in the selection and appointment of arbitrators.  The ruling also con-
firmed that arbitrator qualifications based on national origin, which
are allowed under the ICC Rules of Arbitration and the ICDR Rules of
Arbitration, do not violate English or European Union anti-discrimina-
10 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [23], [43] (appeal taken from Eng.).
11 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 712, [13], [2010] ICR 1435 (Eng.).
12 Id. ¶¶ 27, 30.
13 Id. ¶ 34.
14 Id. ¶ 35.
15 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [70], [74] (appeal taken from Eng.).
16 Id. ¶¶ 15, 23.
17 Id. ¶ 41.
18 Id.
19 Id. ¶¶ 54-59. The concurring opinion, however, casts doubt on this conclusion.
Instead, it opines that someone not of the Ismaili community may be schooled in
its culture and principles such that he or she could qualify as an arbitrator of
disputes between individuals of that community.
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tion laws.  However, does the same hold true for anti-discrimination
laws in the United States?
III. DO ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES APPLY TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS?
It is well established that discrimination in hiring employees is
barred in the United States under a slew of federal and state laws,
most notably Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20  However, it is
equally well established that Title VII and the majority of similar laws
do not apply to the selection and hiring of independent contractors,
who are not considered to be “employees” under state or federal law.21
For the same reasons the UK Supreme Court discussed in Jivraj v.
Hashwani, it is almost certain that courts in the United States would
declare that arbitrators are not “employees,” and, therefore, not cov-
ered by those laws that restrict themselves to banning discrimination
in the selection and hiring of employees.22
However, that is not the end of the story as it was in Jivraj v.
Hashwani.  The United States has laws that ban discrimination in the
hiring of independent contractors or when contracting with any per-
son, no matter how the relationship is characterized.  Most notably,
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 bans discrimination on the
basis of race or ethnicity when entering into all manner of contracts,
including when selecting and hiring independent contractors.23  Fur-
thermore, the Third Circuit recently confirmed that an independent
contractor can bring an action for discrimination under Section 1981.24
Other circuits similarly have found a private remedy for discrimina-
tion against independent contractors under Section 1981.25  However,
Section 1981 is limited to claims for discrimination based on race or
20 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (West 2012).
21 E.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
22 The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission provides a test
to determine whether an individual is an “employee” or an “independent contrac-
tor” for the purposes of anti-discrimination laws. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2-
III, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1. In Na-
tionwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, the Supreme Court construed the ques-
tion of whether an individual is an employee to turn on “the hiring party’s right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.” Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992).  As the appellate court noted in
Jivraj v. Hashwani, once appointed, the parties generally do not control the arbi-
trator’s method and means of carrying out his or her duties. See Jivraj v.
Hashwani, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 712, [40], [2010] ICR 1435 (Eng.).
23 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 2012).
24 Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2009).
25 See Bains, LLC v. ARCO Prods. Co., 405 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2005); Carey v.
FedEx Ground Package Syst., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 902 (S.D. Ohio 2004); Danco,
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ethnicity and does not apply to discrimination based on gender, na-
tional origin, religion, age, or disability.26
There also are state and municipal laws that ban discrimina-
tion when contracting with or hiring independent contractors.  Some of
these laws are quite expansive, covering many forms of discrimination,
including those based on race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, relig-
ion, age, and disability.  For example, New Jersey appellate courts
have found that the state’s ban on discrimination in contracting based
on race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, and sex applies to
contracts that employ independent contractors.27 Like Section 1981,
the New Jersey statute appears to apply to any contract.28  Therefore,
it does not matter how the contracting party is characterized, whether
as an employee or an independent contractor, and it is a violation of
New Jersey law to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender,
religious affiliation, or national origin when contracting with
anyone.29
In addition to New Jersey’s very broad ban on discrimination,
there are other jurisdictions with laws banning discrimination in the
hiring of independent contractors. Pennsylvania has a broad anti-dis-
crimination statute that applies to independent contractors who are
required to get professional licenses under Pennsylvania law.30  The
New York City municipal code also prohibits discrimination in the em-
ployment of independent contractors as part of the New York City
Human Rights Law.31
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 178 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999); Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Med.
Ctr., 842 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1988).
26 See Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1987) (“A plaintiff
states a viable cause of action under §§ 1981 or 1982 only by alleging a deprivation
of his rights on account of his race, ancestry, or ethnic characteristics.”). Some
courts have extended § 1981 to include what may be discrimination based on na-
tional origin. See Danielle Tarantolo, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981
and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE
L.J. 170, 193 n.139 (2006).
27 See J.T.’s Tire Serv., Inc. v. United Rentals N. Am., 985 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2010); Perlowski v. Elson T. Killam Assoc., 894 A.2d 1251 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 2005); Rubin v. Forest S. Chilton Mem’l Hosp., 819 A.2d 22 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2003).
28 N.J. STAT. ANN § 10:5-12 (West 2008).
29 Id.
30 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955 (2012).
31 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 §§ 101–131 (2012).  Although not free from doubt, as
discussed below, § 8-102(5) appears to make the New York City law banning dis-
crimination in employment specifically applicable to independent contractors who
are not themselves employers.  As a municipal law, its terms do not apply outside
New York City, and there is no New York State law of comparable scope applicable
to independent contractors.
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IV. APPLICATION OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES TO
ARBITRATORS
In principle, there is no reason why the federal, state, and mu-
nicipal laws banning discrimination when contracting with indepen-
dent contractors should not apply to the selection and appointment of
arbitrators.  Therefore, Section 1981, within its limits, and state and
municipal statutes prohibiting discrimination in the hiring of indepen-
dent contractors should apply equally to the selection and appoint-
ment of arbitrators.32
The idea that an arbitrator should be treated as an indepen-
dent contractor is not free from doubt.  The concurring opinion in
Jivraj v. Hashwani adopts noted commentator Gary Born’s characteri-
zation of the relationship of the arbitrator to the parties as “sui
generis.”33  In a world where a party contracting to perform services is
either an employee or an independent contractor, it is proposed that
an arbitrator is neither fish nor fowl due to the arbitrator’s indepen-
dent adjudicative, quasi-judicial responsibilities.
A third, exempt category for arbitrators is difficult to justify in
the context of anti-discrimination laws.  Arbitrators are hired to per-
form a service on behalf of the parties to an arbitration agreement.
The arbitrator is under contract to do so and receives payment to per-
form work within the scope of the arbitration agreement.34  Although a
party has no unilateral right to order the arbitrator to decide an issue
in a particular manner, the parties have the autonomy to jointly agree
to terminate the arbitration process and the arbitrator’s services at
any time.35  Thus, the parties jointly retain the power to hire and fire
the arbitrator. They also can void any arbitrator decision by mutual
agreement.36  In other words, the parties jointly retain control over the
arbitrator even if each party individually lacks such power due to the
32 The limitations on the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 probably make it of limited
practical application to arbitration agreements, as there are very few examples of
arbitration agreements that mandate that the arbitrators be of one “race” or
“ethnicity” or another.  Certainly, none of the major arbitration rule sets base arbi-
trator appointments on race or ethnicity.  It is much more common to see arbitra-
tion agreements that restrict arbitrators to a particular religious affiliation or
declare a preference regarding national origin (i.e., the arbitrator should not be of
the same national origin as any of the parties to the arbitration agreement). As
noted above, however, there may be some basis to argue that Section 1981 extends
to forms of national origin discrimination (e.g., where national origin and ethnicity
are considered to be synonymous).
33 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [77] (citing 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1607-09 (2009)).
34 See, e.g., id. at [40]-[41].
35 See, e.g., id. at [42].
36 See, e.g., id.
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contractual nature of the arbitration process.37  In the context of con-
tracting, therefore, a third category other than employee or indepen-
dent contractor does not appear warranted for arbitrators.
The distinctions between “employee,” “independent contrac-
tor,” and a “sui generis” arbitrator-party relationship probably do not
matter for application of Section 1981 and its New Jersey analogue
because those statutes ban discrimination in contracting with any
party, no matter how the relationship is characterized.38  There is lit-
tle doubt that the parties at least have a contractual relationship with
the arbitrator either directly or through an administrative body hired
by the parties to administer the arbitration.  The categorization of the
relationship as “sui generis,” however, may carry more force in regards
to laws like the New York City Human Rights Law, whose application
depends on the characterization of the arbitrator as either an em-
ployee or an independent contractor hired to further the employer’s
business.
V. QUALIFICATION RESTRICTIONS IN AD HOC
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Suppose an ad hoc arbitration agreement39 has a provision
similar to that at issue in Jivraj v. Hashwani, but it calls for arbitra-
tion in New York City under the laws of the United States instead of
arbitration in England.40  This hypothetical arbitration agreement re-
quires that all arbitrators shall be respected members of a particular
religious community and holders of high office within that community.
The arbitration’s purpose is to resolve secular disputes arising out of a
real estate development agreement between a real estate developer
and a construction manager, both of whom are parties to the arbitra-
37 Id.
38 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN
§ 10:5-12 (West 2008).
39 An “ad hoc” arbitration agreement is an agreement where there is no third
party administrator, such as the American Arbitration Association, tasked with
administering the selection and appointment of arbitrators. Domestic courts re-
solve disputes that arise in the selection of arbitrators under ad hoc arbitration
agreements. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION ch. 1, n.c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012).
40 Had the hypothetical concerned an arbitration agreement under the laws of the
state of New Jersey, there could be little dispute that, unless the parties could
establish a bona fide occupational requirement, discrimination in the selection and
appointment of an arbitrator would violate New Jersey law.  Similarly, if the hypo-
thetical arbitration agreement concerned discrimination based on ethnicity or
race, the agreement would violate federal law under Section 1981 unless the par-
ties could establish the restriction as a bona fide occupational requirement. See
Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2010] EWCA (civ) 712, [24], [35].
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tion agreement.  Would such an agreement violate either United
States federal law or New York City’s Human Rights Law?
As discussed above, United States federal law banning discrim-
ination in the workplace under Title VII applies only to “employees.”41
Although there may be a dispute as to whether an arbitrator is an
independent contractor, there should be little dispute that an arbitra-
tor is not an “employee” of the parties.  Accordingly, Title VII’s pro-
scription against discrimination on the basis of religion will not
apply.42  Section 1981 does apply to all manner of contracts including
those with arbitrators, but it is limited to discrimination based on
race, color, and ethnicity.43  Had the hypothetical arbitration agree-
ment limited arbitrators to “white citizens” there would be little doubt
that the arbitration agreement would prima facie violate United
States federal law.  This hypothetical, however, concerns discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion and, therefore, falls outside the scope of
Section 1981.
Discrimination on the basis of religion does fall within the
scope of the New York City Human Rights Law.44  Section 8.107(1) of
the New York City Human Rights Law provides that:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, be-
cause of the actual or perceived age, race, creed, color,
national origin, gender, disability, marital status, part-
nership status, sexual orientation or alienage or citizen-
ship status of any person, to refuse to hire or employ or
to bar or to discharge from employment such person or to
discriminate against such person in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.45
Whether this proscription extends to arbitrators acting as independent
contractors depends on the definition of “employer,” “any person,” and
“employ.”
Section 8.102(5) of the New York City Human Rights Act pro-
vides that:
For purposes of subdivisions one, two, and three of sec-
tion 8-107 and section 8-107.1 of this chapter the term
“employer” does not include any employer with fewer
than four persons in his or her employ. For purposes of
41 See Jivraj, supra note 22.
42 Id.
43 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (West 2012).
44 The scope of the New York City Human Rights Law is such that the hypotheti-
cal could consider race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age,
disability, and other protected classes. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8.107 (2012).
45 Id.
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this subdivision, natural persons employed as indepen-
dent contractors to carry out work in furtherance of an
employer’s business enterprise who are not themselves
employers shall be counted as persons in the employ of
such employer. 46
This section appears to capture within its terms any employer with at
least four persons in its employ, including natural persons employed
as independent contractors.
There may be a question as to whether an arbitrator as an “in-
dependent contractor” is employed “to carry out work in furtherance of
an employer’s business enterprise.”  In the hypothetical, the arbitrator
has been hired to resolve disputes arising out of the conduct of a secu-
lar real estate development business.  So long as either the real estate
developer or the construction manager in the hypothetical employs at
least four persons including independent contractors, at least one of
the parties to the arbitration agreement should qualify as an “em-
ployer.”47  Acting as an arbitrator to resolve disputes arising out of an
employer’s business enterprise, however, may not be considered “work
in furtherance of an employer’s business enterprise.”  In the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Jivraj v. Hashwani, an arbitrator has no partisan
interest and, therefore, does not act in the specific interests of either
party.48  The characterization of the arbitrator’s relationship to the
parties as sui generis due to the adjudicative, quasi-judicial nature of
the position also supports exclusion from the New York City Human
Rights Law.
It could also be argued that an arbitrator is no different from,
for example, an appraiser hired by buyers and seller, or buyers and
lending institutions, to give an independent valuation of property.
There is little doubt that the appraiser would be considered an inde-
pendent contractor hired to further the collective business interests of
the parties.  The idea that an arbitrator is a special class of indepen-
dent contractor, which is exempt from the laws relating to all other
independent contractors, is a narrow interpretation of what it means
to “work in furtherance of an employer’s business enterprise.”  Courts
that do not believe arbitrators should be beneficiaries of anti-discrimi-
nation laws, however, could adopt this idea.  On the other hand, it is at
least equally as likely that a court would find that arbitration agree-
ments are made for the joint benefit of the parties to the agreement
46 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8.102 (2012).
47 The question of whether all persons employed by the employer must be em-
ployed within the confines of New York City is unclear, but the administrative
code implies that may be the case. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8.123 (2012).
48 Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [41] (appeal taken from Eng.).
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and are, therefore, created in furtherance of the parties’ business
enterprises.
The final question of coverage under the New York City
Human Rights Law is whether the discriminatory arbitrator qualifica-
tion requirement amounts to a refusal “to hire or employ or to bar or to
discharge from employment such person or to discriminate against
such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment (emphasis added).”49 The use of the term “person” in this
section of the Act applies to any “natural person.”50 The use of the
term “hire or employ” customarily refers to “employees”; however, the
second clause in Section 8.102(5), as quoted above, indicates a clear
intent to include independent contractors within the definition of
“employ.”51
One possible interpretation of Section 8.102(5)’s use of the term
“employ” to include independent contractors is that the statute’s draft-
ers only intended to include independent contractors for two purposes.
The first purpose was determining whether a party was an “employer”
based on the number of employees and independent contractors em-
ployed.  The second was to determine employer liability for the acts of
an independent contractor employed “to carry out work in furtherance
of an employer’s business enterprise.”52  When interpreting the New
York Human Rights Law, however, courts are required to give the law
. . .an independent liberal construction analysis in all cir-
cumstances, even where state and federal civil rights
laws have comparable language.  The independent anal-
ysis must be targeted to understanding and fulfilling
what the statute characterizes as the City [Human
Rights Law’s] ‘uniquely broad and remedial’ purposes,
which go beyond those of counterpart state or federal
civil rights laws. . . . In short, the text and legislative
history represent a desire that the City [Human Rights
Law] ‘meld the broadest vision of social justice with the
strongest law enforcement deterren. [w]hether or not
that desire is wise as a matter of legislative policy . . . .53
49 N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1) (2012).
50 N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(1) (2012).
51 N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(5) (2012).
52 Id.
53 Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 66, 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); see
also Craig Gurian, A Return to Eyes on the Prize: Litigating under the Restored
New York City Human Rights Law, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 255, 288 (2005); Rep. of
the Legal Div., Comm. on General Welfare, 1991 Amendments to the N.Y.C.
Human Rights Law, available at http://antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/LL
39CommitteeReport.pdf; Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005, 2012 N.Y. Le-
gal Advance Serv. (N.Y. Legal Publ’g Corp.) No. 85 (2005)  (“It is the sense of the
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Accordingly, though not free from doubt, an arbitrator hired by a cov-
ered business enterprise to resolve a dispute regarding the conduct of
that enterprise may fall within the protections of the New York City
Human Rights Law.
Once covered by the New York City Human Rights Law, the
question is whether the provision in the hypothetical requiring the ar-
bitrator to be of a particular religious affiliation is a bona fide occupa-
tional requirement.  The Supreme Court held in Jivraj v. Hashwani
that the religious requirement in that particular arbitration agree-
ment was a bona fide occupational requirement.  It is uncertain
whether a court in the United States would arrive at the same result
given the strict scrutiny usually applied to discriminatory
qualifications.54
In the end, there are defenses to applying the New York
Human Rights Law to arbitrators including issues of how to apply the
definitions under the Law, and whether such restrictions on arbitra-
tors’ qualifications are bona fide occupational requirements.  There is
a substantial risk, however, that a court considering this hypothetical
would determine that the religious affiliation requirement included in
the arbitration agreement would violate the New York City Human
Rights Law.
VI. RESTRICTIONS ON ARBITRATOR QUALIFICATIONS IN AN
ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULE SET
The above hypothetical concerned an ad hoc arbitration agree-
ment.  Suppose the same parties entered into a standard form arbitra-
tion agreement calling for the selection and appointment of an
arbitrator under the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Ar-
bitration under the administration of the ICC’s International Court of
Arbitration. Under those rules, there is a preference for selection of an
arbitrator who is not of the same nationality as any of the parties.
Article 13(5) of the ICC Arbitration Rules provides that:
The sole arbitrator or the president of the arbitral tribu-
nal shall be of a nationality other than those of the par-
ties.  However, in suitable circumstances and provided
Council that New York City’s Human Rights Law has been construed too narrowly
to ensure protection of the civil rights of all persons covered by the law.”).
54 EEOC Decision No. 915.003, Directives Transmittal (2008) (providing that “Ti-
tle VII permits employers to hire and employ employees on the basis of religion if
religion is “a bona fide occupational qualification [“BFOQ”] reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.  It is well settled
that for employers that are not religious organizations and therefore seek to rely
on the BFOQ defense to justify a religious preference, the defense is a narrow one
and can rarely be successfully invoked.”).
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that none of the parties objects within the time limit
fixed by the Court, the sole arbitrator or the president of
the arbitral tribunal may be chosen from a country of
which any of the parties is a national.55
This preference, based on the national origin of the arbitrator,
raises the question of whether the ICC’s standard arbitrator selection
process runs afoul of the New York City Human Rights Law.56  The
question is not idle because New York City is a major center for arbi-
tration both domestic and international.  Indeed, the ICC has a re-
gional office located in New York City and administers cases in that
office.57
When parties designate a set of rules in their arbitration agree-
ment, they are deemed to incorporate those rules in the arbitration
agreement as though fully set forth in the agreement.58  In that re-
spect, the restrictions on national origin found in the arbitration rules
are deemed to be restrictions imposed by the parties unless the parties
provide otherwise.  After all, it is customary to allow parties to over-
ride certain rules and procedures by agreement so that such rules do
not apply to a particular arbitration agreement.59
The parties in this hypothetical could mutually agree to coun-
termand the provision in ICC Rule 13(5) by mandating that an arbitra-
tor appointed by the International Court of Arbitration could be of any
nationality regardless of the nationalities of the parties.  Failure to
countermand the national origin qualification in ICC Rule 13(5) is con-
sidered adoption of the rule by the parties with the national origin re-
striction intact.60 The International Court of Arbitration acts on behalf
of the parties when applying its rules to the selection of an arbitrator.
55 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration & ADR Rules, art. 13, ¶ 5,
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/
arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/#article_1.
56 Although independent contractors are covered under § 1981, because that sec-
tion is limited to discrimination based on race or ethnicity, the national origin
provisions of the ICC Rules would not be covered except in cases where national
origin and religious affiliation are considered synonymous. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
57 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-
services/arbitration-and-adr/appointing-authority/contact-us/ (last visited Aug. 20,
2012).
58 See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration & ADR Rules, art. 6,
¶¶ 1-2, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-
adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/#article_1
59 See, e.g, Jivraj v. Hashwani, UKSC at [42].
60 See International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration & ADR Rules, art.13, ¶ 5.
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The proscriptions in the New York City Human Rights Act apply
equally to the “employer” and its “agent.”61
Otherwise assuming coverage under the New York City
Human Rights Law, the defense to the national origin requirement
must be that it is a bona fide occupational qualification.62  The ratio-
nale behind the ICC Rule regarding national origin is to preserve the
appearance of fairness and lack of bias in international arbitration.
Where the parties are of different nationalities there is a greater ap-
pearance of neutrality if the sole arbitrator or the chair of a three-
person tribunal is not of the same nationality as any one of the parties.
The ICC Rules expressly require that all arbitrators, whether
party appointed or not, “must be and remain impartial and indepen-
dent of the parties involved in the arbitration.”63  At the same time,
the ICC Rules do not prohibit party appointed arbitrators, even the
sole arbitrator or chair of the tribunal, from being of the same nation-
ality as one or more of the parties.64  Even if one party objects to the
appointment of a party appointed arbitrator on the ground that he or
she is of the same nationality as the appointing party, the ICC Court
will not consider that alone as grounds for disqualification.65  The In-
ternational Court of Arbitration must, therefore, believe that an arbi-
trator of the same nationality as one or more of the parties or their
counsel has the capacity, indeed the obligation, to act independently
and impartially.
The question then becomes whether the appearance of neutral-
ity gained by ICC Rule 13(5) over the impartiality and independence
requirements in ICC Rule 11(1) sufficiently justifies discrimination in
the selection and appointment of arbitrators on the basis of national
origin. It is unknown how a court would rule on this issue but, as with
the hypothetical concerning ad hoc arbitrations, there is, at minimum,
a risk that a United States court would not sustain a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification defense to the national origin occupational
requirement.
VII. RESTRICTIONS ON ARBITRATOR QUALIFICATIONS
WHEN USING A ROSTER OF ARBITRATORS
One final tweak to the hypothetical is to have the parties insert
a rule set into their arbitration agreement that relies on an adminis-
trative body to select arbitrators from its own roster of approved arbi-
trators.  An example of this type of rule set is the International Rules
61 N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1) (2012).
62 See, e.g, Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2011] UKSC 40, [7] (appeal taken from Eng.).
63 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration & ADR Rules, art. 11, ¶ 1.
64 Id. at art. 13, ¶ 5.
65 Id.
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and Procedures of the International Center for Dispute Resolution
(ICDR), the international arm of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion.66  The ICDR Rules provide that, “[a]t the request of any party or
on its own initiative, the administrator may appoint nationals of a
country other than that of any of the parties,”67 and thus insert consid-
eration of an arbitrator’s national origin into the arbitrator appoint-
ment equation. This provision would be implemented by having the
ICDR prepare a list of potential arbitrators for consideration by the
parties, but excluding otherwise qualified candidates from ICDR’s ros-
ter of arbitrators who are of the same nationality as a party.
Although generally the same analysis would apply as to the
above versions of the hypothetical, the use of an arbitration service to
engage in the selection of an arbitrator from its own roster of potential
arbitrators presents an additional issue.  Does the ICDR constitute an
“employment agency” under the New York City Human Rights Law
and therefore itself become subject to the anti-discrimination require-
ments in Section 8.107(1)(b) of the Act concerning employment agen-
cies?  An employment agency is defined as “any person undertaking to
procure employees or opportunities to work.”68 “Person” includes “one
or more, natural persons, proprietorships, partnerships, associations,
group associations, organizations, governmental bodies or agencies,
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy,
or receivers.”69  The ICDR may be considered an employment agency
under the terms of the Act simply by providing a roster of arbitrators
for employment by disputants.
Section 107(1)(b) prohibits an employment agency from dis-
criminating when considering applications for its services or when
referring applicants to an employer.70  Accordingly, assuming jurisdic-
tional and definitional requirements are met, there is a real possibility
that restricting the roster of potential arbitrators based on national
origin violates the New York City Human Rights Law.  As above, there
66 As with the ICC Rules, the question regarding ICDR’s rules is not an idle one
like the ICC. The ICDR has a regional office in New York City. See INT’L CTR. FOR
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/oracle/webcenter/
portalapp/pages/contactUs (last visited Aug. 20, 2012).
67 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RES-






68 N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §8-102(2) (2012).
69 Id. § 8-102(1).
70 Id. § 8-107(1)(b).
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is then a question of whether national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional consideration for arbitrators acting under the ICDR Rules.
VIII. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS THAT
VIOLATE U.S. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
The above hypotheticals make two points.  First, it is very pos-
sible that arbitrators are protected from discrimination in their selec-
tion and appointment by state and federal laws to the extent those
statutes apply to independent contractors.  Second, administrative
bodies handling the selection and appointment of arbitrators may also
be subject to laws prohibiting discrimination in the selection and ap-
pointment of arbitrators.  These two conclusions, however, do not com-
pletely define the scope of risk associated with application of the anti-
discrimination laws to arbitration agreements.  Arbitration agree-
ments that run afoul of anti-discrimination laws may be invalid and
unenforceable under applicable law.
A. Domestic Arbitration Agreements
The Federal Arbitration Act governs the recognition and en-
forcement of arbitration agreements in the United States.71  Chapter 1
of the Federal Arbitration Act concerns domestic arbitrations.72  It
mandates the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.”73  The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
this clause to mean that an arbitration agreement might be unenforce-
able if the provisions of the agreement violate state or federal laws
that are generally applicable to contracts rather than laws specific to
arbitration agreements.74  Such laws would include those that prohibit
discrimination in the making of contracts with independent contrac-
tors.75  Accordingly, it is likely that the subject agreement to arbitrate
would not be enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), at
least as originally written by the parties, if a court found that an arbi-
tration agreement violated the laws prohibiting discrimination against
independent contractors.
If a court determines that an arbitration agreement violates
laws banning discrimination in the selection and appointment of arbi-
71 See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (citing
Preston v. Ferrer, 522 U.S. 346, 353 (2008) (stating that the provisions of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act preempt state laws that act as obstacles to the purposes of the
Act)).
72 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
73 Id. § 2.
74 AT&T Mobility, LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
75 Id.
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trators, it faces the choice of whether to void the arbitration agreement
as a whole or to uphold the agreement and remove the offending
clause.76  Thus, if an arbitrator qualification violates state or federal
anti-discrimination laws, a court might opt to use its powers to appoint
an arbitrator under Section 5 of the FAA and “blue pencil” the offend-
ing clause.77  The decision whether to blue-pencil an arbitration agree-
ment is generally made by a case-by-case inquiry as to whether the
offending provision is essential to the purposes of the agreement to
arbitrate.
B. Non-Domestic Arbitration Agreements Subject to the Laws of the
United States
So far the hypotheticals in this article have assumed that the
arbitration agreements were subject to United States laws applicable
to domestic arbitrations.  Now change the facts of the hypothetical so
that it qualifies as a “non-domestic” arbitration agreement where the
parties have agreed that the seat of the arbitration shall be in New
York City.
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act concerns the recogni-
tion and enforcement of non-domestic arbitrations under the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards.78  FAA Chapter 2, Section 208 provides, “Chapter 1 ap-
plies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter to the
extent that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Conven-
tion as ratified by the United States.”79  Accordingly, the provisions of
FAA Chapter 1 relating to domestic arbitrations also apply to non-do-
mestic arbitrations under certain circumstances.80
Under Article V, Section 1(e) of the New York Convention, the
country where arbitration takes place, or under whose laws arbitra-
tion is conducted, has supervisory authority over the conduct of the
arbitration.81  Thus, non-domestic arbitrations held in the United
States fall under the provisions applicable to domestic arbitrations
under the Federal Arbitration Act for the purposes of vacating or en-
forcing arbitration awards under FAA Chapter 1.82
76 See, e.g., Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010).
77 See 9 U.S.C. § 5.
78 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08.
79 9 U.S.C. § 208.
80 Id.
81 See Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
art. 5, § 1(e),  330 U.N.T.S. 38 (June 7, 1959) [hereinafter New York Convention].
82 See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L., v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15,
20 (2d Cir. 1997).
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The New York Convention further provides that an arbitration
award may not be enforced if the “agreement is not valid under the law
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made.”83
Therefore, if an arbitration agreement is invalid under United States
law but is still subject to the laws of the United States, then an arbi-
tration award arising out of such an agreement may also be unenforce-
able in the United States or in another country. Therefore, Section 2 of
the Federal Arbitration Act regarding the validity of domestic arbitra-
tion agreements applies equally to non-domestic arbitration agree-
ments where the seat is in the United States or where the arbitration
agreement is governed by United States law.84
As with domestic arbitrations, it is unknown how a court would
rule on this hypothetical with regard to application of a municipal law
like the New York City Human Rights Law.  However, if a court were
to determine that the facts in the hypothetical violated the New York
City Human Rights Law and, therefore, made the arbitration agree-
ment unenforceable as written, that same conclusion likely would ap-
ply equally to domestic arbitrations and non-domestic arbitrations
where the seat of the arbitration is in New York City.85
C. Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitration Awards Made Outside
the United States
Finally, modify the hypothetical to consider the possible out-
come for an arbitration agreement substantially identical to the one in
Jivraj v. Hashwani.  That is, the arbitration agreement concerns a sec-
ular, commercial dispute requiring that all arbitrators be members of
a particular religion and that the arbitration take place in England.
What would happen if one of the parties to that arbitration attempted
to enforce the arbitration award in the United States?  Could a United
States court rely on an applicable anti-discrimination statute at the
forum of enforcement to refuse to enforce the award?
The provisions of Federal Arbitration Act Chapter 2 apply
when determining whether a court will enforce the award since it is an
arbitration award issued outside the United States.  Under FAA Chap-
ter 2, Section 207,
83 Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
supra note 81, at art. 5, § 1(a).
84 See Yusef Ahment Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L., 126 F.3d at 19.
85 Federal arbitration law as implemented in the Federal Arbitration Act does not
preempt state or local law unless the state or local law acts to obstruct the pur-
poses of the FAA.  Although the case law on this issue distinguishes between fed-
eral and state law, the same rule applies to a potential conflict between federal
and municipal law. See AT&T Mobility, LLC, supra note 71.
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The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of
the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or en-
forcement of the award specified in the said
Convention.86
The grounds specified in the Convention are considered the exclusive
grounds on which a court may refuse to confirm a foreign arbitral
award covered by Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.87  Accord-
ingly, the question is whether there are any grounds under the New
York Convention to refuse enforcement of the hypothetical award.
All New York Convention grounds for refusal to enforce a for-
eign arbitral award appear in Article V.  First, it is clear that Article
V.1(a) does not apply.  That provision permits refusal to enforce an ar-
bitration agreement where:
said [arbitration] agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indica-
tion thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made.88
Under the hypothetical, although the arbitration agreement might be
invalid had it been made in New York City, the arbitration agreement
would be valid under the laws where it was made. Based on the out-
come of Jivraj v. Hashwani, the hypothetical arbitration agreement is
valid in England where the award was made and under whose law the
arbitration agreement was made.
New York Convention Article V.1(d), concerning the composi-
tion of the arbitral tribunal, also does not apply to this hypothetical.
That provision provides that recognition and enforcement may be re-
fused where:
The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of
the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accor-
dance with the law of the country where the arbitration
took place.89
In the hypothetical, the arbitral tribunal’s composition is in accor-
dance with the arbitration agreement, and that agreement is in accord
with the laws of England, where the hypothetical arbitration took
86 9 U.S.C. § 207 (West 2012).
87 See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, supra note 82; Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v.
Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 181-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Int’l Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. Dyncorp Aero. Tech., 763 F.
Supp. 2d 12, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
88 New York Convention, supra note 81, at art. V, § 1(d).
89 Id.
2012] ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 401
place.  None of the other grounds under Article V.1 of the New York
Convention apply to this hypothetical.
The only further potential ground for refusal to enforce the hy-
pothetical arbitration award is found in Article V.2(b):
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
also be refused if the competent authority in the country
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
* * * (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.90
The question for Article V.2(b), therefore, is whether an arbitration
agreement that is legal where made but that violates anti-discrimina-
tion laws in the United States can be enforced in the United States, or
whether it is barred as a matter of public policy.
The public policy exception is narrowly construed.91  In Par-
sons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du
Papier, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the public-policy defense should be narrowly construed lest it be-
come a “major loophole in the [New York] Convention’s mechanism for
enforcement.”92  Therefore, “[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral awards
may be denied . . . only where enforcement would violate the forum
state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.”93
The public policy “must be well defined and dominant.”94  Fur-
thermore, the public-policy defense “must be construed in light of the
overriding purpose of the [New York] Convention, which is ‘to en-
courage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by
which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are
enforced in the signatory countries.’”95
A party urging a court to refuse enforcement under the public
policy exception would have to argue that the enforcement of an arbi-
tral award violates public policy because the manner of selecting the
arbitrators would violate United States anti-discrimination laws and
90 Id. at art. V, §2.
91 See Europcar Italia, S.P.A v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir.
1998); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GMBH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir.
1996); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974).
92 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., 508 F.2d at 974.
93 Id.
94 Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1987)
(quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461
U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
95 Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int’l Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 152 (2d
Cir. 1984) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)).
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that such laws constitute the most basic notions of morality and jus-
tice.96  This argument would also depend, however, on whether a pro-
cedural issue, rather than the substance of the award itself, is
sufficient to qualify as a violation of public policy under the New York
Convention, an issue that is not free from doubt.
The public-policy defense to enforcement of a non-domestic ar-
bitral award is rarely successful in U.S. Courts.97  Nonetheless, sev-
eral courts have suggested that the public policy ground might be
available where the makeup and constitution of the arbitral tribunal is
in question.98  In Transmarine Seaways Corp. v. Marc Rich & Co., the
court stated that,
Under Article V(2)(b) [of the New York Convention], en-
forcement of an award may be denied if contrary to this
country’s public policy.  The Supreme Court’s elucidation
of arbitral propriety in Commonwealth Coatings [393
U.S. 145 (1968)] is a declaration of public policy.  If [the
arbitrator’s] presence on the panel offended the princi-
ples declared in that case and its progeny, the award will
not be enforced.99
Transmarine Seaways concerned a non-domestic arbitration held in
New York City, where the court could have applied FAA Chapter 1
grounds to determine whether to enforce the award because the arbi-
tration was under the supervision of an United States domestic court.
The court, however, applied New York Convention Article V(2)(b)’s
public policy grounds.100  The court found no bias and did not refuse to
enforce the award on that ground.101  Significantly though, at least
one court believed that the appointment and selection of an arbitrator
in violation of Commonwealth Coatings, discussed below, could be a
96 See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., supra note 92, at 974.
97 See Andrew M. Campbell, Refusal to Enforce Foreign Arbitration Awards on
Public Policy Grounds, 144 A.L.R. FED. 481 (2005). However, there have been rare
cases where the public policy exception was partially successful. See Laminoirs-
Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (portion of French interest rate in international arbitration award not
enforced because it violated Georgia public policy: “[A] foreign law will not be en-
forced if it is penal only and relates to the punishing of public wrongs as contradis-
tinguished from the redressing of private injuries.”).
98 Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160, 169
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“I accept that the propriety of the makeup of an arbitration panel
sufficiently implicates public policy to fall within article V(2)(b) of the conven-
tion. . . .”); Transmarine Seaways Corp. v. Marc Rich & Co., 480 F. Supp. 352, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
99 Transmarine Seaways Corp., 480 F. Supp. at 357.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 358.
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basis for a public policy refusal to enforce an award under Article
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.102
In Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co., the
United States Supreme Court held that an arbitration award must be
vacated where the arbitrator had the appearance of bias based on his
failure to disclose a close business relationship with one of the par-
ties.103  The Court held:
This rule of arbitration and this canon of judicial ethics
rest on the premise that any tribunal permitted by law to
try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased,
but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.  We
cannot believe that it was the purpose of Congress to au-
thorize litigants to submit their cases and controversies
to arbitration boards that might reasonably be thought
biased against one litigant and favorable to another.104
Although Commonwealth Coatings was a domestic arbitration case,
based on the international arbitration cases referred to above, at least
some courts will apply the principles of Commonwealth Coatings and
refuse to enforce foreign arbitral awards on the basis of the public pol-
icy exception when the respondent establishes arbitrator bias or the
appearance of bias.
There are no published U.S. cases where discrimination in the
makeup of the arbitral tribunal was asserted as the basis for refusing
to enforce the arbitration award on public policy grounds,105 but laws
banning discrimination are no less important than the public policy
102 Id. at 357.
103 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 147 (1968).
104 Id. at 150.
105 One U.S. case that raises the issue of discrimination in connection with the
enforcement of an international arbitration award is Karen Maritime Ltd. v. Omar
International Inc., in which the respondent argued that confirmation of a non-
domestic arbitration award would violate public policy and, therefore, should be
refused under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention because the underlying
contract between the parties violated U.S. public policy. In that case, a charter
agreement entered into by the parties included a requirement that the contracted
vessel “is not Israeli owned or controlled, and will not call at Israeli ports.” The
respondent contended that the contract on which the award was based violated
anti-boycott laws and anti-discrimination laws. With respect to the anti-discrimi-
nation laws (notably, § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act), the court held that this
ground did not apply because “[t]he charter party’s objectionable language . . .
applies to individuals outside the jurisdiction of the United States.” The court
found the anti-boycott ground to be a much closer question, but ultimately ruled
that the basis for the arbitration award had nothing to do with the anti-boycott
laws and, in any event, the respondent had unclean hands. Karen Maritime Ltd. v.
Omar Int’l Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 224, 225, 228-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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banning arbitrator bias.  Indeed, selecting an arbitrator based on race,
ethnicity, national origin, gender or other protected class very well
may violate the principles of Commonwealth Coatings and constitute
the appearance of bias.106
There is no doubt that federal and state laws banning discrimi-
nation are a clear statement of public policy.107  Indeed, the New York
City Human Rights Law (used in the above hypothetical) declares:
[T]here is no greater danger to the health, morals, safety
and welfare of the city and its inhabitants than the exis-
tence of groups prejudiced against one another and an-
tagonistic to each other because of their actual or
perceived differences, including those based on race,
color, creed, age, national origin, alienage or citizenship
status, [or] gender. . . .108
It is yet to be seen whether a court will refuse to enforce a foreign
arbitral award where the selection and appointment of the arbitrator
was done in a manner that violates the anti-discrimination policies at
the place of enforcement, but existing case law suggests that such a
risk exists.
XII. CONCLUSION
From time-to-time, parties to arbitration agreements insert
qualifications for arbitrators that would violate federal, state, or mu-
nicipal laws in the United States that bar discrimination when con-
tracting with any persons, including independent contractors.  It is
possible that such discriminatory arbitration agreements made in
United States jurisdictions where such discrimination is prohibited as
a matter of public policy would be declared completely or partially in-
valid unless the proponents of the discriminatory qualification could
establish a bona fide occupational qualification.
This also holds true for non-domestic arbitrations where the
parties have selected United States law to govern their arbitration
agreement and the seat of the arbitration is in the United States.  For
arbitration agreements whose seat is outside the United States and
106 It would be difficult to attribute actual bias to the appointed arbitrator on the
basis of discrimination in the selection and appointment process to which the se-
lected arbitrator is not a party. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 429
F.3d 640, 645 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United
Mine Workers of Am., 48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995)) (alleging partiality of an
arbitrator must be direct, definite, and capable of demonstration to vacate an arbi-
tration award).
107 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961); Burks v.
Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 471 (1962).
108 N.Y.C, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 8-101 (2011).
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where the arbitration agreement’s discriminatory aspects are legal but
violate the anti-discrimination laws of the place of enforcement, it is
possible that a United States court would refuse to enforce such an
award on public policy grounds.  For example, a United States court
might find an arbitration agreement prohibiting the appointment of
“non-white” arbitrators repugnant to United States public policy and,
on that basis, refuse enforcement of the arbitration agreement and any
resulting award.
What does this mean for the legacy of Jivraj v. Hashwani?  Due
to the narrow grounds on which the public policy exception to enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards historically has been permitted in the
United States, one would expect there to be a great deal of difficulty in
opposing enforcement of a foreign arbitral award even where the non-
domestic arbitration agreement would violate U.S. anti-discrimination
laws on the selection and appointment of arbitrators had the agree-
ment been made in the United States.  Where the parties’ arbitration
agreement has selected a location in the United States where anti-dis-
crimination laws apply to arbitrators, however, there is a risk that the
arbitration agreement, or the arbitrator selection provisions, will be
declared invalid.  As a practical matter, arbitration agreements that
incorporate rule sets that provide preferences based on national origin
may be declared invalid in places like New York City and New Jersey
unless the parties to such agreements disavow the institutional re-
strictions on national origin, something generally permitted by the
major rule sets.

